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The great aim of the struggle for liberty has been equality before the law.
The term rule of law, since reformulated by A.V. Dicey in the 19th century, has traditionally meant to include such notions as supremacy of standing law over arbitrary power, equality before the law (which applies also to government officials), and a binding constitutional framework. In the broader context of Hayeks work in political philosophy, his idea of equality is meant to incorporate these notions. The following essay sketches out some highlights of the struggle for this ideal, and then address the role that equality before the lawand the rule of law more generallyperforms in allowing modern civilization to prosper.
In The Constitution of Liberty Hayek explains that only equality before the law, and not equality of outcomes, is consistent with a free society. Material inequality is in fact a necessary by-product of freedom. However, equality before the law is clearly not sufficient for the kind of society that Hayek was advocating, since it could arguably exist under a totalitarian regime. It must exist as part of the rule of law, or a meta-legal doctrine or political ideal that puts limitations on what laws ought to be.
The notion of equality before the law arose soon after government was established in its earliest form, for it only makes sense once people move out of family or small tribal communities into larger, impersonal societies. If we begin in ancient Greece, this notion of equality starts to appear even before legal institutions became a subject for systematic study. Aristotle spoke of the rule of laws instead of men, and Pericleswhom Hayek quotes approvinglythought this to be a distinguishing characteristic of Athens. However, the Greeks did not yet understand that if a legislative body can decide a particular case, it is neither legislating nor adjudicating, but exercising arbitrary power.
Nor was this fully understood by the Roman Republic, although as this was the beginning of law in its modern sense, some of its weaknesses might be forgiven. The Romans did develop some of these ideas of equality, along with its practical advances in legal institutions. The failure of Greek law, by contrast, was the lack of a competent tribunal to apply the private law to its citizens. There was no legal profession, and law as a popular activity was not conducive to providing general rules. These defects were partly remedied in Rome, and [t]he result, according to Zane, was that among the Romans there was a rule of law. Courts began the process of resolving particular cases according to general rules, and writers such as Cicero argued that not all enacted laws are necessarily just. Although Rome was a hierarchical society, Hayek admired the late republican period for its advances, until these were reversed during the Empire. The emperors of Rome decreed themselves to be above the law (something which would be reincarnated many times in European history), but even they felt the need to justify their power as coming from the will of the people.
The idea of the rule of law would survive howeverif a bit bloodiedthrough the Germanic kingdoms of the Dark Ages. In early medieval political theory, which was dominated by the Church, rebellion against the king was not permitted, but the idea of the king being bound by the law was seen throughout the period. The rule of law was emerging, and England took its role as the leader of this tradition. The Magna Carta was the first step in a process that would culminate in the Glorious Revolution nearly a half-millennium later. Of course even England did not realize the ideal of individual liberty during this long evolutionary period, but it was developing a legal tradition that would set it apart from the Continent.
Following Hayek, we can jump ahead in our story, as individual liberty in modern times can hardly be traced back further than the England of the seventeenth century. And as J.M. Kelly noted, [Equality before the law] is a value which, in a Europe full of privilege, found a full expression only in the voice of the English revolution. The ideas were heard most clearly from the Levellers during the English Civil Wars, and then from Locke, whose most influential works would come after the Glorious Revolution. The sole function of the government, according to Locke, was the protection of property in the broad sense, meaning lives, liberties and estates. And even though he would endorse majority rule, he also argued that the legislature should not have arbitrary power. Also notable in this century was a conception of natural rights that focused on individuals rather than social duty, as well as a secular rather than theological foundation. Outside of England, for example, Pufendorf would anticipate Kant: Let no one act towards another in such a way that the latter can justly complain that his equality of right has been violated.
In the 18th century, we begin to see the split in intellectual traditions that Hayek often addressed. The rationalists, most notably in France, wanted to start anew and base everything on reason, while the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment (whom Hayek admired so much) did not, but instead wrote of establishments which are indeed the result of human action but not the execution of human design. It was in fact the unintended consequences of the early rationalist view that led to setbacks for liberty, rather than a deliberate strategy advocating centralized power. During this time, the call for laws to be subject to reason was a reaction to the arbitrary rule and privileges of the elite, so the intentions of these writers and activists were consistent with what would become classical liberalism. Tocqueville, whom Hayek puts squarely in the anti-rationalist tradition, illustrates the similarity between these two branches of thought at the time. In summing up the theme of the Enlightenment writers, Tocqueville writes:
They all started with the principle that it was necessary to substitute simple and elementary rules, based on reason and natural law, for the complicated and traditional customs which regulated society in their time...The whole of the political philosophy of the eighteenth century is really comprised in that single notion.
It was only when the rationalist vision was brought to its logical conclusion in the French Revolution that it became antithetical to liberty. Edmund Burke would become a fierce critic of the Revolution and its intellectual foundations, and his claim for the superiority of organically grown systems over those designed in the name of reason would be repeated by Hayek.
The rationalist school of thought would continue to have great influence, and it led to the codification of laws in continental Europe and the reform movements from the 19th century to the present day. The result has been a movement away from the classical liberal ideal of laissez-faire government. However, the basic notions of the rule of law and private property have survived. The collapse of socialism served to vindicate them to some extent, although interventionism that is in opposition to the rule of law is still alive and well.
Finally, Hayek and others saw the early United States as taking over the tradition of individual liberty from England, as the colonists objected to the increasingly arbitrary power of the British Parliament. They saw the necessity of a written constitution to limit the power of any particular branch of government, and saw it also as laying down general principles to prevent arbitrary rule. It so happens that this attempt at division of powers has not succeeded, nor did the attempts to limit legislative power to strictly enumerated functions, but certainly the intentions of the Framers were in line with this classical liberal tradition. An important point is that despite appearances, the American constitution was not a product of the rationalist French tradition, as the government emerged from general principles and its structure even a few years later could not have been anticipated by its framers. While there are many examples when the legislature and courts have ignored these general principles, there survives something of a consensus that prevented an even greater encroachment of liberty. The U.S. experience has been another in the long line of imperfect experiments in forming a free society.
The Functions of Liberty
According to Noel B. Reynolds, The rule of law is a solution to a problem, and as the classical liberal tradition has always recognized, the problem is tyranny. Hayek would hardly disagree, but incorporating his insights on how markets work, he saw the fundamental problem solved by a free society to be the use of dispersed knowledge that can never be known to a centralized body. Giving people equal opportunities to use their knowledge for their own ends not only fulfills the Kantian maxim of respecting the autonomy of the individual, but is how society adapts to new conditions and discovers new ways to live. As Hayek put it, a condition of liberty in which all are allowed to use their knowledge for their purposes, restrained only by rules of just conduct of universal application, is likely to produce for them the best conditions for achieving their aims.
This may seem uncontroversial, but the opposing mindset tends to ask the question: Why shouldnt the government attempt to use our inherited knowledge of society and scientific method to improve on institutions that have evolved without conscious direction? The fact that many people, and especially our political leaders, would surely think this to be a reasonable goal shows that Hayek was not merely arguing against a straw man, nor was his analysis only appropriate for central planning of the early 20th century variety.
It should be pointed out that the formula equality before the law is not a simple guide to policy, nor is anything like laissez-faire or respecting private property. So the question is how to define the private sphere of action in which individuals can use their own knowledge for their own ends. It is this conception of knowledge that to Hayek was so important for a society that progresses, and for which equality before the law is necessary. In most of his writings, Hayek was more concerned with the process in which this these limits were decided, rather than laying out the proper functions of government in any detail. This is why he often advocated the adjudication by courts as opposed to legislation; the former is more adaptable, more likely to incorporate local knowledge of the parties involved, and less likely to result in restrictions on parties not involved in a particular dispute.
Buchanan takes a similar approach:
Each man counts for one, and that is that...Once this basic premise is fully acknowledged...[a] criterion for betterness is suggested. A situation is judged good to the extent that it allows individuals to get what they want to get, whatsoever this might be, limited only by the principle of mutual agreement. Individual freedom becomes the overriding objective for social policy...
The alternative to this is to use the subjective valuationsusually in the guise of objectivityof some particular person or group. Yet Buchanan also argued that anarchy was not practicable. So for him the question was also how to define the limits on freedom, and he also places emphasis on the (individualist) process by which this is determined, rather than specific outcomes.
The rules defining individuals protected domain must solve certain problems that are inherent in a modern society. Besides the division of knowledge, there is the tendency for people to favor their own interests, and also the problem of power, or enforcement abuse. The latter refers to problems inherent in allowing a monopoly on coercionin other words, the erroneous or improper use of force. The rule of law is the most effective way yet discovered to deal with all of these issues. A proper conception of this ideal leads to a process for delimiting private property and enforcing contracts, which allows individual knowledge to be used effectively and for disparate aims to be reconciled. In particular, the process consistent with this is an evolutionary growth of law guided by general principles, hence the emphasis on adjudication by courts.
To take a more concrete example, consider the provision of public goods. It is often claimed that government is necessary to overcome the free-rider problem. To argue this, however, it is not only necessary to show that free-riding is sub-optimal, but also that taxation and government provision is an improvement. This is not obvious once you consider the knowledge and interest problemsthat is, in not using local and individual knowledge that may be able to provide this good, and ignoring the incentives faced by government officials. Private property and freedom of contract, which is part of the framework that naturally evolves from the conception of the rule of law, do provide incentives (however imperfect) to solve the free-rider problem.
It is important to keep in mind that even Hayeks richer development of the notion of the rule of law may not be enough to guarantee a liberal society. The conditions of generality and abstractness of law that he emphasized can conceivably occur in a non-liberal regime, and Hayek was led to make concessions to government intervention that would likely be rejected by many other classical liberals. This is part of the reason to emphasize the historical development of the rule of law, as Hayek was always aware of the evolutionary nature of changes in society. This is also why Barnett, who argues for the classical liberal rule of law along with a polycentric legal order (i.e. one without a coercive monopoly), points out that whether this order will be liberal will depend on how it comes abouta violent overthrow is likely to have different consequences than a peaceful reform movement.
No one is suggesting that issues of path dependence, evolved cultural differences, and entrenched interest groups are problems to be ignored when it comes to reform. The failed attempts to transplant Western institutions to other countries make that abundantly clear. But of the ways that people have tried to organize themselves in society, the most successful have followed, at least in part, this classical liberal tradition. How these foundations can be improved even further, and how to implement and maintain them in different societies, are questions that are still seeking answers.
Just as private property benefits even those who dont own any, we might also say that equality before the law also benefits those who never need to exercise it, or are blissfully unaware of it. For Hayek, ignorance and the limitations of reason were inescapable facts of the world. But he put great importance on the battle of ideas, and to understand liberty requires knowledge of the rule of law.
 F.A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 85.
 See Todd Zywicki, The Rule of Law, Freedom, and Prosperity, Supreme Court Economic Review, Vol. 10, 2003, pp. 1-26.
 Even more insightful is Hayeks explanation of how inequality is necessary for experimentation and progress. See Hayek, supra note 1, at pp. 42-49.
 See Ibid., at 205-210 and F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972 ), ch. 6.
 As Zane put it, In order to insure equal laws it was found, long ages after the Greeks and Romans, that the judicial power must be separately and independently exercised. John Maxcy Zane, The Story of Law, 2nd. ed (Indianopolis: Liberty Fund, 1998), p. 105.
 Hayek, supra note 1, at 162.
 J.M. Kelly, A Short History of Western Legal Theory, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 236.
 Quoted in Ibid., p. 226. For Hayeks emphasis on Kants importance, see Chandran Kukathas, Hayek and Modern Liberalism, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) and Hayek supra note 1, at pp. 196-197.
 See in particular, Individualism: True and False, in F.A. Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948).
 Adam Ferguson, quoted by Hayek supra note 1, at p. 57.
 Quoted in Kelly, supra note 9, at p. 251.
 F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. 1: Rules and Order, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 1. See also James Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan, (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2000 ), p. 19. Hayeks point of course is not that all checks have been eliminated, but the conclusion hardly seems as controversial as it might at first glace, given a casual investigation of Congressional acts or popular beliefs about states rights vs. centralized power.
 Hayek supra note 1, at pp. 183-84.
 Hayek writes approvingly of the Supreme Courts rejection of FDRs attempt at accumulating discretionary powers for specific ends. See Ibid., pp. 190-91.
 Quoted in Zywicki, supra note 2, at p.5.
 For Hayeks classic exposition of the role of knowledge in the price system, see The Use of Knowledge in Society, in Hayek, supra note 11.
 Hayek supra note 13, at p. 55.
 Bruno Leoni made similar points in arguing against legislation. See Bruno Leoni, Freedom and the Law, (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1991), pp. 6, 22.
 Buchanan, supra note 13, at p. 4.
 See Randy Barnett, The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), and Hayek supra note 13, at p. 107.
 For the preceding discussion, see Barnett, supra note 21, at pp. 162 ff. The point is similar to Demsetzs distinction betweeen the nirvana approach and the comparative institution approach. See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, J. Law Econ., Vol. 12, No. 1 (Apr., 1969), pp. 1-22. For some classic examples of market solutions for provision of public goods and solving externality problems, see Ronald Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, J. Law Econ., Vol. 17, No. 2 (Oct., 1974), pp. 357-76, and Steven N S Cheung, The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation, J. Law Econ., Vol. 16, No. 1 (Apr., 1973), pp. 11-33.
 For some of Hayeks (sympathetic) critics on this point, see Kukathas, supra note 10, and Norman Barry, The Tradition of Spontaneous Order, Literature of Liberty, Vol. V, No. 2 (Summer 1982), pp. 7-58. One example of Hayeks controversial policy positions is his view on compulsory military service; see Hayek supra note 1, at p. 143.
 As a response to this general line of criticism, Barnett argues throughout his book that the formal requirements of the rule of the law do place limits on substance.
 For path dependence and the role of institutions, see Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), esp. ch. 12.
 See Hayek supra note 13, at p. 121.
The rule of law is one of the longest established common law fundamental principles of the governance of the United Kingdom, dating to Magna Carta of 1215, particularly jurisprudence following its late 13th century re-drafting. It as a minimum subjects an otherwise absolute monarch (executive) and all free people within its jurisdictions, primarily those of England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland to legal doctrines known as the general principles of law. It has evolved to work only alongside equal application of the law to all free people 'equality before the law' and within the framework of the constitutional monarchy supports the legal doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Exactly what it entails beyond this and the way that different aspects of the rule of law principle are applied, depends on the specific situation and era.
Among recognised academics in this field are Albert Dicey, Joseph Raz (building on thoughts by Friedrich Hayek) and Trevor Allan, who have proposed contrasting ideas about the scope of the rule of law: specifically, whether the emphasis is on legal form or substantive content and normatively if it should be.
The rule of law is emphasised through many separate ideas. Among them are that law and order in contrast to anarchy; the running of government in line with the law (i.e. "legal government") and normative discussion about the rights of the state as compared to the individual.Albert Venn Dicey described the rule of law as acting in three ways: the predominance of regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power; equality before the law; and, that constitutional laws are not the source but the consequence of the rights of individuals.
The specific checking of arbitrary power is its oldest and most definitive concept as a consequence of Magna Carta and its byproduct, the first representative Parliament of England (and soon officially thereafter known as of England of Wales), which denied for the first time from the King the completely unfettered powers formerly exercised by the most powerful absolute monarchs on the throne. The key clause in the document has been consistently translated from identical, though abbreviated, latin.
- To no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice.
This was by the 14th century interpreted by Parliament as guaranteeing trial by jury.
Similarly in Scotland a Parliament evolved. Before its union with England and Wales in 1707 it was long portrayed as a constitutionally defective body that acted merely as a rubber stamp for royal decisions, but research during the early 21st century has found that it played an active role in Scottish affairs, and was sometimes a thorn in the side of the Scottish crown.
The enforcement of the doctrine of habeas corpus was widely achieved in the 17th century, however with slavery primarily in the colonies continuing, it was not until the successes of abolitionism in the United Kingdom, the Slave Trade Act of 1807 and Slavery Abolition Act 1833, that equality before the law throughout the Empire was in a formal legal sense achieved in this respect.
The Bill of Rights 1689 and two most recent Acts of Settlement (1701 and 1703) imposed constraints on the monarch and it fell to Parliament under the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty to impose its own constitutional conventions involving the people, the monarch (or Secretaries of State in cabinet and Privy Council) and the court system. All of these three groups of institutions have proven wary of upsetting or offending the others, adopting conventions designed to ensure their long-term integrity and hence self-preservation.
After ordinary executive decisions were delegated, such as to a recognised Prime Minister and cabinet system from the mid 18th century, following on from the Bill of Rights 1689 in the Glorious Revolution, the highest courts laid down jurisprudence entrenching the growing doctrines of the Enrolled bill rule and Parliamentary sovereignty. In return Parliament has acquiesced in the senior courts' ability to declare unlawful new legislation based on older Treaty-based legislation for instance the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 in the Factortame I and IV decisions and executive actions in judicial reviews often based on the Human Rights Act 1998 (and in turn or separately the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International Covenants). These developments have entrenched the doctrine of the rule of law as part of the constitution.
Prevention of crime
Law and order requires the prevention of crime only, and, as such, it does not matter by what means these are achieved, or what the characteristics of the law are. This concept of the rule of the law can, therefore, be upheld by even the most tyrannical dictatorship. Such a regime may allow for the normal operation of courts between private parties, and the limited questioning of the government within the dictatorial framework. Whether the rule of law can truly exist without democracy is debated. Freedom of expression and action seems to be what the prevention of crime allows citizens; therefore, limiting it by autocratic means has been considered incompatible with the rule of law. However, the picture is much clearer in the other direction: for democracy to thrive, the rule of law (in this limited sense) must be observed.
Public authorities must act within the law assigned to them, a second approach to the rule of law. Any actions taken outside the law are ultra vires and cannot be sanctioned by the courts. Entick v Carrington was a landmark case in terms of the English law, with the famous dictum of Camden LJ: "If this is law it would be found in our books, but no such law ever existed in this country".Joseph Raz identifies government following the law as a tautology: if the will of those inside the government were expressed outside their legal constraints, they would no longer be acting as the government. He therefore characterises this legal form argument as one of mere obedience to the law; ensuring those in government follow the laws as those outside it should. He rejects that as the sole conception of the rule of law. In the 2008 case of R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No 2), an Order in Council of the British government was found to have no basis in law by a minority of judges on final appeal. Additional powers can be granted to actors on behalf of the government only through parliament. In the United Kingdom, sanctions for departing from these rules come through ordinary court procedure; in other countries they may be assigned to designated courts. Government departments are directly liable for damage caused by their acts; however, the sovereign retains immunity from prosecution. This immunity runs wider that the Head of State of other countries, for example, the President of the United States may be impeached then put on trial. In M v Home Office the Home Secretary was found to be liable for contempt of court. On the other hand, Acts of Parliament that contravene basic rights – such as the indefinite detention without trial of suspected terrorists – whilst adhering to this concept of the rule of law.
This is identified by Dicey as part of his first conception: "a man may with us be punished for a breach of law, but he can be punished for nothing else".
Any substantive version of the rule of law as it applies to the United Kingdom asks normative questions about what rules the government should be under, rather than merely ensuring it follows those it is under. The rule of law is thus likely to be invoked when considering controversial powers of the government that stray from precedent, depart from the European Convention of Human Rights as embodied in the Human Rights Act 1998, and break new legislative ground.
This interpretation is particularly controversial. If the rule of law is to enforce specific "constitutional" or "core" rights, what they should be is difficult to decide. Among them are questions of whether ideas such as the right not to be held indefinitely without trial, deemed contrary to the Convention in A v Home Secretary, could ever be deemed appropriate if circumstances changed. In R. ex parte (Corner House Research) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office (2008), the defendant public prosecution body chief was deemed to allow national security considerations to take precedence over a thorough investigation into alleged bribery in certain arms deals, which is that departure from completely equal application of the law (including its application to the Crown) in order to protect life may result in a perceived breach of the modern-day rule of law.
Trevor Allan sees the rule of law as, primarily, a vehicle for the protection of rights against "irresponsible legislative encroachment" in the face of a government with a large authority, backed by (normally) a significant majority in the House of Commons. The rule of law is contrasted with rule by men, and the arbitrary power one man might exercise over the other – the people require protection from the government. This leads him to support the "core" features of the rule of law, including government acting within its legal authority. Noting that this is not incompatible with wide discretionary powers on the part of the government, Allan then goes on to accept Raz's complaint, below, that too wide a definition is to expound a complete social philosophy. He instead chooses a conception that is not so wide, whilst being not as limited as Raz's.
Opposition to substantive content
In particular, Joseph Raz has argued that the rule of law should be limited to formal values – although formal values wider than merely maintaining law and order. These include transparency of law making, non-retroactive law, the independence of the judiciary and wide access to the courts, and the right to a fair trial. He suggests that the rule of law has become a by-word for general political ideals, separate from its actual meaning: "if the rule of law is the rule of good law then to explain its nature is to expound a complete social philosophy". Instead, he identifies principles of "open and relatively stable" lawmaking, and laws that the public can live their lives by. This concept is a merely formal one, he identifies, because this could be achieved through dictatorship, democracy, or any other means. He expresses confidence that this conception is not so restricted an approach as to be meaningless. Raz drew on similar ideas expressed by Friedrich Hayek, including "stripped of all technicalities, [the rule of law] means that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand – rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge." Raz identifies eight principles instead: prospective, open and clear laws; relatively stable laws; laws based on stable, open and open and clear rules; the independence of the judiciary; the principles of natural justice (unbiased judiciary); judicial review of implementation; accessible courts; and no perversion of the law by policing discretion. However, he considers the list incomplete.
- ^ abBradley, Ewing (2011). p. 95.
- ^ abDicey (1914). Part 2, chapter 4.
- ^"Magna Carta an introduction" The British Library. Retrieved 4 February 2015.
- ^ abcWade, Sir William (1996). "Sovereignty - Evolution or Revolution?". Law Quarterly Review. 112: 574.
- ^R. Rait, 'Parliaments of Scotland' (1928)
- ^Brown and Tanner, passim; R. Tanner, The Late Medieval Scottish Parliament, passim; K. Brown and A. Mann, History of the Scottish Parliament, ii, passim
- ^Bradley, Ewing (2011). pp. 95–96.
- ^ EWHC KB J98
- ^ abBradley, Ewing (2011). p. 96.
- ^Raz (1977). pp. 196–197.
- ^Bradley, Ewing (2011). pp. 96–97.
- ^Bradley, Ewing (2011). p. 97.
- ^Bradley, Ewing (2011). pp. 97–98.
- ^ abcBradley, Ewing (2011). p. 98.
- ^Allan (1985). pp. 111–112.
- ^Allan (1985). pp. 112–113.
- ^Allan (1985). p. 113.
- ^Allan (1985). pp. 113–114.
- ^Raz (1997). p. 195.
- ^ abRaz (1997). p. 198.
- ^Taken from The Road to Serfdom (1945): quoted in Raz (1977) p. 195.
- ^Raz (1977). pp. 198–201.
- ^Raz (1977). p. 202.